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THE BENEFITS OF A BENEFIT
CORPORATION STATUTE FOR
ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS
William Robinson*
ABSTRACT
In the forty-five years since the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act
(ANCSA) created the Alaska Native regional corporation and village
corporations, shareholders and outside observers have criticized the statute’s use
of the traditional corporate form as inappropriate for Alaska Native communities.
The emergence of the benefit corporation entity across the United States may soon
mean that Native corporations have a promising alternative. If Alaska joins the
majority of states that have adopted this new legal entity, Native corporations
would have an opportunity to significantly reform their corporate governance
within the existing framework of ANCSA. This Note will argue that Alaska
should enact a benefit corporation statute because it would give Native
corporations a legal entity that better fits their purpose. As benefit corporations,
Native corporations would commit to pursuing public benefits, and their
directors would be required to consider factors beyond shareholder value in
making decisions.

INTRODUCTION
Forty-five years ago President Richard Nixon signed the Alaska
Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA), granting roughly forty-five
million acres of land and about $1 billion to Alaska’s Native population
in exchange for relinquishing any other land claims they might have in
the state. 1 ANCSA also directed the incorporation of regional and village
corporations to manage the resources of Alaska Natives. 2 The larger
regional corporations were required to be organized “for profit” under

Copyright © 2016 by William Robinson.
* J.D. Candidate, Duke University School of Law, 2017; B.A., Public Policy,
Duke University, 2011.
1. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)).
2. Id. § 1606(a)–(c).
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Alaska state law. 3 Congress and the Alaska Natives who advocated for
the statute hoped the corporations would foster self-determination
among Alaska Natives, allowing them to serve as stewards of the land
and assets they received under ANCSA. 4
Although many have recognized that ANCSA was a significant
legislative accomplishment for Alaska Natives, 5 both Native corporation
shareholders and outside observers have argued that the corporation was
the wrong legal entity to effectuate the broad objectives of the Native
corporations and ANCSA. 6 Critics of the Native corporation model have
argued that corporate law and its imposition of shareholder primacy is at
odds with Alaska Native culture and many of the broader goals of Native
corporations. 7 For instance, Native corporation shareholders may prefer
that Native corporation directors be required to consider factors other
than maximizing dividends and shareholder value. 8 While ANCSA
3. Id.
4. See DONALD CRAIG MITCHELL, TAKE MY LAND, TAKE MY LIFE: THE STORY OF
CONGRESS’S HISTORIC SETTLEMENT OF ALASKA NATIVE LAND CLAIMS, 1960-1971 541
(2001) (“ANCSA was an unprecedented experiment in Native American
economic self-determination that Alaska Natives actively participated in
crafting.”).
5. See, e.g., id. (arguing that ANCSA was not forced upon Alaska Natives by
Congress, but that Alaska Natives played a major role in advocating for the law);
see also Robert T. Anderson, Alaska Native Rights, Statehood, and Unfinished Business,
43 TULSA L. REV. 17, 32 (2007) (ANCSA “has been praised by many in terms of the
amounts of land and money awarded, but others have decried [its] failings with
respect to tribal sovereignty and protection of hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights.”).
6. See Eric C. Chaffee, Business Organizations and Tribal Self-Determination: A
Critical Reexamination of the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, 25 ALASKA L. REV.
107, 146 (2008) (arguing that Native corporations should be allowed to operate
with “nonprofit goals”); see also Morgan Howard, Dividends Do Not Define Success
for Alaska Native Corporations, ALASKA DISPATCH NEWS, Oct. 23, 2014,
http://www.adn.com/article/20141023/dividends-do-not-define-successalaska-native-corporations (arguing that Native corporations have a broader
purpose than paying out dividends and should instead value the collective over
the individual in assessing how to benefit shareholders).
7. See, e.g., CERT. OF INC., AHTNA INC., ART. III (June 23, 1972) (stating a
corporate purpose “to promote the economic, social, cultural and personal wellbeing of all Natives”); see also Chaffee, supra note 6, at 133 (“One major problem
with forcing Alaska Native communities to adopt the corporate form is that
corporations measure success by financial performance, rather than by success in
land stewardship.”); see also Native corp. charters, etc.; but see Linda O. Smiddy,
Responding to Professor Janda—The U.S. Experience: The Alaska Native Claims
Settlement Act (ANCSA) Regional Corporation as a Form of Social Enterprise, 30 VT. L.
REV. 823, 825 (2006) (“There is some evidence that Natives have adapted the
business corporation form to reflect both Native cultural traditions involving
collective relationships to land and subsistence economies and a Western culture
characterized by private property, individual rights, and market capitalism.”).
8. See, e.g., Howard, supra note 6 (writing in an op-ed, Howard, a village
corporation director, argues that Native corporations should weigh broader
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requires that regional corporations exist as “for profit” entities under
Alaska law, some have argued that Native corporations would be better
off as legal entities that more closely resemble non-profits. 9 For the past
forty-five years, no such quasi-non-profit legal entity has existed in
Alaska, 10 and Native corporations have had no transformative alternative
option to consider. 11 However, that may soon change. 12
In 2016, Alaska’s House of Representatives considered whether to
pass a bill that would have allowed businesses to incorporate as benefit
corporations (commonly referred to as “B Corps”) under state law. 13 If
Alaska had passed the benefit corporation statute, it would have joined
the majority of states that have already enacted similar statutes. 14 Under
the proposed legislation, Native corporation shareholders would have
been able to vote on whether to convert to benefit corporations. 15 If a
Native corporation became a benefit corporation, its directors would be
required to consider a range of factors beyond maximizing dividends and
shareholder value. 16 The Native corporation would also need to commit
to pursuing public benefits, and report biennially on its progress in
furthering these objectives. 17 Directors would risk liability to the public if
they failed to pursue these broad goals. 18 Converting to a benefit
corporation would be a significant legal transformation for a Native
corporation. This Note will argue that, given the criticism of Native
corporations that has persisted since ANCSA’s enactment, Native
corporations and their shareholders should at least have the chance to
consider making this transformation.
Part I of this Note gives an overview of the Alaska Native
corporations, tracing their history and some criticism received in the last

objectives than dividend maximization).
9. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 146. ANCSA requires Native corporations to be
organized “for profit.” 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). Furthermore, the Native
corporations have shareholders while non-profits may not have shareholders. Id.
10. See generally Daniel William Fessler, The Alaska Corporations Code: The
Forty-Ninth State Claims the Middle Ground, 7 ALASKA L. REV. 1 (1990) (explaining
the distinctive aspects of the Alaska Corporations Code).
11. They could potentially become limited liability companies, but their duties
to members would not be dramatically different from their duties to shareholders.
12. See H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015) (proposing a new
incorporation method for businesses).
13. Id.
SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
LAW
TRACKER,
14. RESPONSIFY,
http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Sept. 22, 2016) (United
States map displaying state legislation on benefit corporations from 2009 to 2016).
15. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.010).
16. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.030–10.60.500).
17. Id.
18. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.300).
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forty-five years. 19 Part II describes the emergence of the benefit
corporation entity in the U.S. and examines the implications of its possible
introduction in Alaska. Part III argues that Alaska should seize the
opportunity to pass a benefit corporation statute, and thus give Native
corporations the chance to consider an alternative legal entity.

I.

OVERVIEW OF ANCSA’S ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS

Following Alaska’s first major oil strike in 1957 and its statehood two
years later, oil companies began advocating 20 for resolution of the
uncertainty around Alaska Native land ownership in the state. 21 Congress
enacted ANCSA in 1971 as a comprehensive response. 22 The statute deals
almost entirely with land. 23 Under ANCSA, Alaska Natives gave up “any
claim” they might have to about 360 million acres of land in exchange for
45.5 million acres and $962.5 million. 24
ANCSA required that regional corporations be formed “for profit”
under Alaska law to manage these assets. 25 ANCSA also required the
formation of village corporations, and some assets were transferred to
these local entities. 26 Village corporations typically received the “surface
estate.” 27 Regional corporations received some of the surface estate, but
also acquired the resource-rich “subsurface estate.” 28

19. Anderson, supra note 5, at 31 (“Passage of the ANCSA in 1971 was
undoubtedly the most important event in the history of Alaska Native people
since 1867. If one views it from the perspective of the state and oil companies’
intent on development of oil and gas at Prudhoe Bay, ANCSA was a resounding
success.”)
20. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3–4; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 28 (stating
that possibly the most important pressure behind ANCSA’s enactment “was the
fact that the state and federal governments’ effort to construct a pipeline to
transport oil from newly discovered oil fields . . . was thwarted by Native claims
to aboriginal title.”).
21. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 116.
22. Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 92-203, 85 Stat. 688
(1971) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1629h (2012)).
23. See DAVID S. CASE & DAVID A. VOLUCK, ALASKA NATIVES AND AMERICAN
LAWS 35 (3d ed. 2012) (describing ANCSA as having a “relatively narrow purpose”
to settle land claims and explaining that the statute “primarily describes the
express procedures whereby land settlement was to be achieved.”) [hereinafter
CASE & VOLUCK]; see also Anderson, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that ANCSA did
not address tribal self-governance issues or hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
of Alaska Natives).
24. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 109.
25. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d); twelve regional corporations were created, plus a
thirteenth for Alaska Natives not residing in Alaska. Id. § 1606(a), (c).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1607(a).
27. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 171–72.
28. Id.
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Each Alaska Native person alive on December 18, 1971 29 was entitled
to receive one hundred shares in a corresponding regional corporation. 30
Share transfer was temporarily restricted by ANCSA 31 and later restricted
indefinitely by the so-called 1991 amendments to ANCSA. 32 ANCSA
generally exempted the Native corporations from the federal securities
laws. 33 Further, ANCSA compels the regional Native corporations to
share their timber and subsurface natural resource revenues with each
other proportionally. 34 Regional corporations must also share revenue
with the village corporations. 35 Otherwise, Native corporation
shareholders are treated like other corporate shareholders under the
Alaska Corporations Code. 36 Shareholders elect a board of directors that
owes fiduciary duties, and they count on receiving regular dividend
payments from the corporation. 37 Although their financial track record
has been mixed, 38 Native corporations have developed businesses in oil
29. Native corporations have taken different approaches on whether to issue
shares to younger people. See generally CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 190
(noting that most corporations are weighing these interests in moving forward).
30. § 1606(g)(1)(A).
31. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 159.
32. COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.07[3][b][ii][C] (Nell Jessup
Newton ed., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN’S HANDBOOK] (“The major feature of the
1991 amendments is the indefinite extension of restrictions on alienation of Native
corporation stock.”).
33. 43 U.S.C. § 1625; see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 196 (describing
the amendments to ANCSA that made the exemptions indefinite and detailing
Alaska’s state securities regulations, which are applicable to the largest Native
corporations).
34. § 1606(i)–(m); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 175–76 (stating that
after extensive litigation over the revenue sharing provision, a settlement to
modify it was ultimately agreed upon).
35. § 1606(i)–(m); see also CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 175–76 (stating that
after extensive litigation over the revenue sharing provision, a settlement to
modify it was ultimately agreed upon).
36. See, e.g., Rude v. Cook Inlet Region, Inc., 294 P.3d 76 (Alaska 2012) (holding
that a Native corporation did not have to list the candidates not recommended by
its board in its proxy materials). Admittedly, Native Corporations have received
significant special treatment under federal law, such as being able to sell their
taxable losses during the 1980s, CASE & VOLUCK supra note 23, at 180–81, and
receive federal contracting preferences, Robert O’Harrow Jr., For Many with Stake
in Alaska Native Corporations, Promise of Better Life Remains Unfulfilled, WASH. POST
(Sept.
30,
2010,
10:53
AM),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/09/29/AR2010092906318.html.
37. See, e.g., Holmes v. Wolf, 243 P.3d 584 (Alaska 2010) (interpreting the
Alaska Corporations Code in ruling on a plaintiff’s claim for director’s breach of
fiduciary duties against Leisnoi, Inc., a village corporation); see also MITCHELL,
supra note 4, at 509 (describing how unemployed Alaska Natives may need to live
off their dividend checks).
38. See Jennifer LaFleur and Michael Grabell, Alaska Native Corporations
Financials,
PROPUBLICA
(Dec.
15,
2010,
8:00
PM),
http://projects.propublica.org/tables/alaska-native-corporations-financials
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and gas, mining, construction, timber, real estate, and a variety of other
areas. 39 They have also taken advantage of preferences that allow them to
receive discounts in Federal Communications Commission auctions by
participating in high-profile transactions with other major U.S.
corporations like Dish Network. 40
A.

The Purpose of the Alaska Native Corporations

At their incorporation, shareholders, legislators, and other
stakeholders ascribed an array of purposes to Alaska Native corporations.
Congress mandated the corporate form for Alaska Native corporations in
ANCSA because legislators and Alaska Native advocates for the statute
believed it would promote self-determination for Alaska Natives. 41
Legislators also hoped to integrate Alaska Natives into the framework of
American capitalism. 42 ANCSA said the statute’s settlement “should be
accomplished rapidly, with certainty, in conformity with the real
economic and social needs of Natives, without litigation, with maximum
participation by Natives in decisions affecting their rights and property .
. . .” 43
The regional corporations’ original certificates of incorporation
include the standard corporate language, 44 such as the broad statement
that the corporation will be formed to engage in “any and all lawful

(“[Native corporation] performance, as measured by revenue growth and
dividends paid to shareholders, varies widely.”); see also Stephen Colt, Alaska
Natives and the “New Harpoon”: Economic Performance of the ANCSA Regional
Corporations, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 155, 155–56 (2005) (stating that
Native corporations mostly performed poorly for their first twenty years of
existence with some notable exceptions).
39. Colt, supra note 38, at 161–62.
40. Shalini Ramachandran, Kate Linebaugh & Ryan Knutson, Behind Dish
Wireless Coup, Ties to Alaskan Native Groups, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/behind-dish-wireless-coup-ties-to-alaskannative-groups-1423017463; see also Colt, supra note 38, at 162 (describing how Cook
Inlet Region Inc. used federal preferences to participate in broadcast deals with
other companies).
41. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 541.
42. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 188; see also COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra
note 32, § 4.07[3][b][ii][B] (stating that ANCSA was “calculated to speed
assimilation of Alaska Natives into corporate America”).
43. 43 U.S.C. § 1601(b) (2012).
44. Corporations typically state that they are formed for “any lawful
purpose,” or use similar language in their corporate charter. This allows them to
avoid ultra vires lawsuits. See, e.g., Askinuk Corp. v. Lower Yukon School Dist.,
214 P.3d 259, 266 n.14 (Alaska 2009) (defining ultra vires as an action which is
outside a corporation’s powers as governed by corporate law and its articles of
incorporation).
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enterprises, businesses, undertakings and activities . . . .” 45 However,
some Native corporations went further in their charters. Ahtna, Inc., for
example, adopted as one of its corporate purposes: “to promote the
economic, social, cultural and personal well-being of all Natives” in its
ANCSA-designated region. 46 Bristol Bay Native Corporation listed
among its corporate purposes the goal of furthering the interests of its
stockholders, but also promoting the “economic development” of
stockholders and villages. 47 Native corporations also listed land
management as another corporate purpose in their original charters. 48
Native corporations have often taken on roles more commonly
associated with governments than with corporate entities because
ANCSA did nothing to address questions surrounding tribal selfgovernance. 49 Many of the Native corporation mission statements reveal
that they are guardians of Native culture, 50 as much as managers of
shareholder value. On its website, Cook Inlet Region, Inc. (CIRI) states
that its mission is: “to promote the economic and social well-being and
Alaska Native heritage of our shareholders, now and into the future,
through prudent stewardship of the company’s resources, while
furthering self-sufficiency among CIRI shareholders and their families.” 51
Arctic Slope Regional Corporation’s website states that the corporation’s
mission is to: “actively manage our businesses, our lands and resources,
our investments, and our relationships to enhance Iñupiaq cultural and
economic freedom – with continuity, responsibility, and integrity.” 52 Job
45. CERT. OF INC., SEALASKA CORP., ART. III (June 16, 1972).
46. CERT. OF INC., AHTNA, INC., ART. III (June 23, 1972).
47. CERT. OF INC., BRISTOL BAY NATIVE CORP., ART. III (June 13, 1972).
48. See, e.g., id. (listing land management as a corporate purpose).
49. See Anderson, supra note 5, at 35–36 (describing how ANCSA was drafted
to focus on land and stating that as a result it failed to include any mechanisms
promoting Alaska Native self-government other than the Native corporations
themselves); see also Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520,
523 (1998) (holding that land Alaska Natives received under ANCSA is not
“Indian country,” thus limiting tribal jurisdiction over the land).
50. It is also interesting to compare the statements on Native corporation
websites and in the original charters with the statements made by the Native
corporations’ associated nonprofits. See, e.g., Mission and History, BRISTOL BAY
NATIVE ASS’N, http://www.bbna.com/about-us/mission-and-history (last
visited Oct. 2, 2016) (“The Mission of [Bristol Bay Native Ass’n] is to maintain and
promote a strong regional organization . . . to serve as a unified voice to provide
social, economic, cultural, educational opportunities and initiatives to benefit the
Tribes and the Native people of Bristol Bay.”).
51. Our
CIRI,
Our
Values,
COOK
INLET
REGION,
INC.,
http://www.ciri.com/our-corporation/mission-vision-and-values/ (last visited
Oct. 2, 2016).
52. We
Are
ASRC,
ARCTIC
SLOPE
REGIONAL
CORP.,
https://www.asrc.com/Pages/We%20are%20ASRC.aspx (last visited Oct. 2,
2016).
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creation has been a priority for many Native corporations. 53 Village
corporations have also sought to provide special financial assistance for
elderly members of their communities. 54
During the decades after ANCSA’s enactment, the Alaska Native
leaders who negotiated ANCSA and incorporated the Native
corporations also formed non-profit organizations that focus on cultural,
educational, and health objectives. 55 Every regional corporation and some
of the village corporations now have corresponding non-profits that
provide health and social services. 56 The regional Native corporations
provide millions of dollars in annual funding for their corresponding
regional non-profits. 57 ANCSA amendments allowing for “settlement
trusts” and the provision of benefits to shareholders’ families have
provided Native corporations with programs they can use to support
Alaska Native communities. 58 For an ordinary corporation, programs like
these would violate corporate law’s mandate that all shareholders of the
same class receive equal distributions. 59 However, ANCSA has
preempted state corporate law in order to allow Native corporations to
use them. 60
B.

Criticism of the Native Corporations and Their Perceived
Shortcomings

This section outlines three of the most common criticisms of Alaska
Native corporations: (1) overemphasis on dividend payouts to
53. Gigi Berardi, The Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) – Whose
Settlement Was It? An Overview of Salient Issues, 25 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L.
131, 134 n.17 (2005).
54. See, e.g., Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1323–24 (Alaska 1997)
(describing a village corporation’s plan to compensate its original elderly
shareholders).
55. See, e.g., Mission and History, BRISTOL BAY NATIVE ASS’N,
http://www.bbna.com/about-us/mission-and-history/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2016)
(stating that the BBNA was incorporated in 1973); Perpetuating and Enhancing
Southeast
Alaska
Native
Cultures,
SEALASKA
HERITAGE,
http://www.sealaskaheritage.org/about (last visited Oct. 2, 2016) (stating that
Sealaska Heritage was formed by the Sealaska corporation in 1980); see also CASE
& VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 178 (“The regional nonprofit Native corporations were
the advocacy organizations that pursued the settlement of the Alaska Native
claims as well as the ANCSA-designated incorporators of the regional profit
corporations.”).
56. BOB POE, 2014 ECONOMIC IMPACT REPORT, ANCSA REGIONAL ASSOCIATION 6
(2014),http://ancsaregional.com/wpcontent/uploads/2013/12/ANCSA_economic-report.pdf.
57. Id.
58. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197.
59. Id.
60. Id.
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shareholders, (2) the poor fit of corporate law to Alaska Native culture,
and (3) the failure of corporations to improve the economic status of
Alaska Natives. Much of this criticism is essentially an argument that the
corporate form is the wrong legal entity for Native corporations. 61 In
particular, critics charge that Native corporations are too focused on
maximizing dividend payouts and therefore neglect their broader
purposes. 62 Ultimately, this is a critique of the legal requirement that as
corporations they must put shareholder value ahead of other objectives.
Corporations are legally obligated to maximize value for their
shareholders, or else their directors risk liability. 63 Some states have
passed stakeholder statutes that allow corporate directors to consider
stakeholders other than shareholders—such as employees or community
members—when making decisions. 64 However, Alaska is one of the few
states that has not enacted a constituency statute. 65 Alaska corporations,
including Native corporations, are therefore legally obligated to ensure
that every decision they make is somehow related to boosting shareholder
value. 66 In most situations, the business judgment rule applies 67 and gives
corporations broad leeway to make decisions as long as they can show
that the decision may boost shareholder value in some way. 68 Like most
corporations, Alaska Native corporations are rarely challenged on the
grounds that a proposed action is ultra vires. 69 Still, their flexibility is
61. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 507 (“[I]n practice, the principal . . . standard
Alaska Natives have employed to measure the success of regional and village
corporations has been the size and frequency of dividend checks.”); Chaffee, supra
note 6, at 134 (“Directors and officers are burdened with corporate fiduciary
duties to achieve financial success while trying to represent traditional interests,
such as conservation of the land and preservation of subsistence rights.”).
62. See supra note 61; see also Howard, supra note 6 (arguing that Native
corporations should not overly focus on dividends).
63. See, e.g., Leo E. Strine, Jr., Our Continuing Struggle with the Idea that ForProfit Corporations Seek Profit, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 135, 146 (2012) (“Ultimately,
any for-profit corporation that sells shares to others has to be accountable to its
stockholders for delivering a financial return.”).
64. Adam Winkler, Corporate Law or the Law of Business?: Stakeholders and
Corporate Governance at the End of History, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 109, 122
(2004).
65. Nathan E. Standley, Note, Lessons Learned from the Capitulation of the
Constituency Statute, 4 ELON L. REV. 209, 217 (2012). Stakeholder statutes are also
sometimes referred to as constituency statutes. Id. at 209.
66. See Strine, supra note 63, at 146–48 (providing background on shareholder
primacy).
67. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270, 278 (Alaska 1980)
(stating that “judges are not business experts” and that fact underlies the business
judgment rule).
68. Id.
69. See supra note 44 and accompanying text; see also Askinuk Corp. v. Lower
Yukon Sch. Dist., 214 P.3d 259, 266 n.14 (Alaska 2009) (stating that a Native
corporation’s decision to lease land to a school district for one dollar a year was

33.2 NOTE - ROBINSON (DO NOT DELETE)

338

ALASKA LAW REVIEW

12/12/2016 7:10 PM

Vol. 33:2

limited by the requirement they put shareholders first and treat all
shareholders equally. 70 Even the business judgment rule mandates that
corporations show they are promoting shareholder interests in some
way. 71
Critics have also argued that corporate law is a poor cultural fit for
Alaska Natives. 72 Specifically, some Alaska Natives have said that buying
into corporate law doctrines was a departure from their heritage. 73 Some
Alaska Native communities still follow a subsistence lifestyle, meaning
that they engage in hunting, fishing, or gathering for the purpose of
obtaining food, or for cultural or traditional reasons. 74 The rights and
responsibilities of corporate shareholders often conflict with this lifestyle.
Alaska Natives also have a sociocultural relationship with land, and they
expect Native corporations to be stewards of land rather than simply asset
managers. 75 The environment holds a position in Alaska Native culture
that it does not necessarily assume for corporate managers. Corporate
managers must view land as an asset to be managed for the benefit of
shareholder payouts. 76 Alaska Native corporations’ fiduciary duties to
their shareholders have made it difficult for them to help Native
communities maintain traditional cultural or subsistence lifestyles. 77
Many Alaska Natives have embraced modern amenities, even in areas
where doing so conflicts with their traditional lifestyles. 78 Nearly every
Congress since ANCSA was passed in 1971 has amended the statute to
address various concerns, 79 and the idea that the federal government

not ultra vires).
70. See Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 939 P.2d 1320, 1324 (Alaska 1997)
(holding that Native corporation program meant to compensate elderly
shareholders was illegal); but see Sierra v. Goldbelt, Inc., 25 P.3d 697, 702 (Alaska
2001) (holding that ANCSA authorized a Native corporation program to
compensate the elderly).
71. Jesse Finfrock & Eric Talley, Social Entrepreneurship and Uncorporations,
2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 1867, 1870–71 (2014).
72. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 132.
73. See, e.g., MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 520 (stating that Alaska Native rights
activist and ANCSA advocate Willie Hensley believed that requiring all villages
to form a corporation was a mistake).
74. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, 265–66 (stating that defining
“subsistence” is “politically difficult,” but that the term can encompass “economic
and physical reliance,” as well as culture and tradition).
75. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 521 (describing Alaska Natives’ view that
“the land is their life” and the “contention that Alaska Natives have a
psychological relationship with, and spiritual attachment to, land that is different,
and in some way qualitatively superior to, that of non-Natives . . . .”).
76. Id. at 521–23.
77. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 132.
78. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 512–13.
79. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 165.
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could simply direct the integration of Alaska Natives with American
capitalism and thereby solve their problems has been mostly rejected. 80
Still, the most damaging criticism of Alaska Native corporations is
that they have failed to boost the economic well-being of Alaska
Natives. 81 While their financial performance has varied widely, the
Native corporations have lost money overall and some have had to
declare bankruptcy. 82 By the 1980s, both regional and village corporations
were struggling financially due largely to the costs of implementing
ANCSA. 83 According to David S. Case and David A. Voluck, the Native
corporations were effectively refinanced in the 1980s by a provision in the
federal tax code that allowed them to sell their net operating losses to
profitable companies. 84 During this period, sales of operating losses
generated a return of $1.25 billion for the Native corporations and
restored many of them to financial stability. 85 This bailed out many
Native corporations. 86
Despite the government bailout of the Native corporations, many
Alaska Natives still face dire economic circumstances in their personal
lives. The percentage of Alaska Natives living in poverty is almost double
the national rate. 87 Native corporations are commonly criticized for
failing to bring jobs back to Native communities. 88 Lucrative management
jobs at Native corporations are often held by non-Native executives. 89
Native shareholders receive dividend payments, which often function as
welfare payments. 90 Native corporations have to a meaningful extent
80. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK, supra note 32, § 4.07[3][b][ii][C] (“Alaska Natives
have been included expressly among the beneficiaries in most major Indian
legislation since the enactment of ANCSA, based on the continuing fiduciary
relationship between the federal government and Alaska Natives. These measures
indicate that Congress has largely abandoned the assimilationist objectives
manifested in 1971.”).
81. O’Harrow, supra note 36.
82. Colt, supra note 38, at 155–56, 161.
83. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 179.
84. Id. at 186; see also MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 518 (“In 1986, when [U.S.
Senator] Ted Stevens arranged for Congress to insert the provision in the Internal
Revenue Code that authorized ANCSA corporations to sell operating losses,
southeast Alaska corporations sold most of their remaining timber at fire-sale
prices in order to generate losses that they then sold to other corporations for cash,
much of which was distributed to shareholders as dividends.”).
85. CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 181.
86. Id.
87. STEPHANIE MARTIN & ALEXANDRA HILL, THE CHANGING ECONOMIC STATUS
OF ALASKA NATIVES, 1970-2007 1 (Institute of Social and Economic Research,
University
of
Alaska
Anchorage
ed.,
2009),
http://www.iser.uaa.alaska.edu/Publications/webnote/WebNote5.pdf.
88. MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 534–35.
89. O’Harrow, supra note 36.
90. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 509 (citing an Anchorage Daily News article
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failed to boost economic growth, especially in the remote regions where
many Alaska Natives live. 91 In addition to these distributional problems,
tension now exists over how best to incorporate younger Alaska Natives
as corporate shareholders. 92
In sum, the Native corporations have not only failed to meet their
broader goals as guardians of culture, heritage, and land; they have also
failed by traditional corporate measures like profitability.

II. OVERVIEW OF BENEFIT CORPORATIONS IN THE U.S. AND
POSSIBLE USE IN ALASKA
A benefit corporation is a business that operates for profit, yet is
legally obligated to consider how it will benefit the public. 93 Unlike a
constituency statute, which makes considering groups other than
shareholders permissive, the benefit corporation legal entity makes it
mandatory for directors to consider how corporate actions will affect
constituencies other than shareholders. 94 Under the model legislation, an
existing corporation can convert to a benefit corporation by getting
approval from two-thirds of its shareholders or by amending its charter. 95
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation, which is promoted by a
nonprofit called B Lab, 96 requires that benefit corporations create a
general public benefit, which it describes as a “material positive impact
on society and the environment . . . .” 97 Corporations can optionally
identify additional specific public benefits. 98 For example, these may

describing the possibility that some Alaska Natives may need to live off their
dividend checks due to widespread unemployment).
91. See O’Harrow, supra note 36 (describing lack of benefits to Alaska natives
that live a subsistence lifestyle).
92. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 186 (describing the approaches taken
by Native corporations on whether to issue shares to children of original
shareholders).
93. See generally Mark J. Loewenstein, Benefit Corporations: A Challenge in
Corporate Governance, 68 BUS. LAW. 1007 (2013) (analyzing and criticizing benefit
corporation statutes).
94. Id. at 1025–26.
95. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 104(a), 102 (B LAB, Draft with Explanatory
Comments,
Apr.
4,
2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legisl
ation_4_16.pdf.
96. B Lab encourages states to adopt the model legislation. Loewenstein, supra
note 93 at 1013. It also reviews benefit corporations and designates them as
“Certified B Corporation[s]” if they pay a fee and meet certain conditions. Id.
97. MODEL
BENEFIT
CORP.
LEGIS.
§
102
(2016),
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/Model%20Benefit%20Corp%20Legisl
ation_4_16.pdf.
98. Id. § 201(b).
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include promoting economic opportunities for a particular community. 99
The benefit corporation is required to focus on creating or pursuing the
stated public benefits when it makes any decision. 100 In other words, it is
not allowed to focus solely on boosting shareholder value. 101 Shareholder
value is only one of several factors the directors of a benefit corporation
must consider, along with other objectives like positively affecting the
environment. 102 Under B Lab’s model legislation, the corporation must
appoint an independent benefit director. 103 This director supervises the
corporation’s commitment to pursuing public benefits and considering
various constituencies. 104 The benefit corporations must also issue an
annual benefit report to update shareholders and the public on its
progress in pursuing public benefits. 105 The model legislation also
includes a provision for a benefit enforcement proceeding, which would
make directors liable if they failed to pursue a public benefit or focused
only on boosting shareholder value. 106
In sum, the Business Corporation Model Legislation goes much
further than a constituency statute or nonlegal ideals like corporate social
responsibility. The model legislation requires directors to actively work
toward public benefits, or risk legal liability. 107
A.

Adoption of U.S. Benefit Corporation Statutes

Since 2010, a majority of states have enacted a benefit corporation
statute. 108 While state legislators have embraced benefit corporations,
business promoters have not flocked to the new entity. Relatively few
businesses have chosen to take advantage of the new laws by
incorporating as benefit corporations. 109 However, some evidence
suggests that the entity’s growth trajectory is tracking that of the limited
liability company. 110

Id. § 102.
Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1013–15.
Id.
Id. at 1007.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 302(b).
Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1023–25.
Id. at 1015–20.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 305(a)(1).
Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1020.
Maryland enacted the first benefit corporation statute in 2010. RESPONSIFY,
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE LAW TRACKER, http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps
(last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
109. Finfrock & Talley, supra note 71, at 1869.
110. Id.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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In addition, benefit corporations are the subject of significant
skepticism, especially from legal scholars. 111 One view is that benefit
corporations are unnecessary because traditional corporations already
have the freedom to spend their money just about any way they choose,
as long as their spending has some link to the benefit of shareholders. 112
William H. Clark, Jr., the drafter of the model legislation, rebuts this
premise. 113 Clark argues that the requirement of shareholder primacy
dating to the Michigan Supreme Court’s 1919 holding in Dodge v. Ford 114
is still pervasive in corporate law. 115 In Clark’s view, the benefit
corporation statute provides a meaningful alternative because it requires
corporate directors to consider factors other than shareholder value. 116
A cynical observer could also characterize the decision to become a
benefit corporation as a public relations or marketing gimmick. 117 Many
of the businesses that have chosen to become benefit corporations are
consumer-oriented. Ice cream chain Ben & Jerry’s and apparel brand
Patagonia are two examples of benefit corporations well known to U.S.
consumers. 118 Part of the legal entity’s appeal for these businesses was
likely the opportunity to show their customers that they are socially
conscious brands.
In addition, some legal scholars view the Model Benefit Corporation
Legislation as impractical because directors are forced to make
unstructured decisions about vague objectives. 119 Professor Mark J.
Loewenstein argues that benefit corporation directors have an
“impossible task” under the model legislation. 120 In his view, a benefit
corporation that is committed both to protecting the environment and
bringing jobs to its local community must ultimately choose between
111. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036 (arguing that benefit
corporation directors have an “impossible task”).
112. See id. (“Some have argued that benefit corporation legislation is
unnecessary because current corporate statutes provide the necessary flexibility
to allow social entrepreneurs to pursue non-profit maximizing strategies.”).
113. William H. Clark, Jr. & Elizabeth K. Babson, How Benefit Corporations are
Redefining the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 817, 825–
29 (2012).
114. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
115. Clark & Babson, supra note 113, at 825–29.
116. Id. at 840.
117. See Jena McGregor, What Etsy, Patagonia and Warby Parker Have in Common,
WASH. POST (Apr. 20, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/onleadership/wp/2015/04/20/what-etsy-patagonia-and-warby-parker-have-incommon/ (“Some companies that go through the [B Lab] certification see it as a
marketing tool that helps promote their do-gooder business approach in a
credible way to customers, potential employees or socially minded investors.”).
118. Id.
119. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1011.
120. Id. at 1036.
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these ideals. 121 Furthermore, Delaware Chancellor Leo E. Strine, Jr. argues
that corporate directors are entrusted with other people’s money and
therefore can only be tasked with the goal of making money for
investors. 122 Strine argues that it is not feasible for directors to use outside
investors’ money to achieve social goals, especially because there are so
many different social goals to pursue. 123 In sum, corporate law experts
remain skeptical about benefit corporations even though a majority of
state legislatures have now enacted benefit corporation statutes. Alaska’s
legislature can take these critiques into consideration when it considers
adopting its own benefit corporation statute.
B.

The Benefit Corporation Bill Recently Proposed in the Alaska
House of Representatives

The Alaska House of Representative considered passing a benefit
corporation statute this year. 124 The proposed statute largely tracked B
Lab’s model legislation and contained relatively insignificant deviations
from it. 125 Although the bill had bipartisan support from legislators, it did
not pass in 2016. 126 According to a legislative aide for one of the bill’s
sponsors, similar legislation may be reintroduced in a future legislative
session. 127 The bill required benefit corporations to add a benefit
director. 128 It also required all directors to consider a variety of
constituencies. 129 Although it did not use the phrase “benefit enforcement
proceeding,” this appears to have been only a semantic deviation from
the model legislation because it included a provision that put effectively
the same scheme in place. 130
Alaska’s benefit corporation bill did not mention the Native
corporations, apparently affording them the same treatment as other
121. Id. at 1029.
122. See Strine, supra note 63, at 150–51 (arguing that it is unrealistic for
directors to aspire to goals other than shareholder wealth maximization).
123. Id.
124. H.R. 49, 29th Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2015).
125. Compare Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 1–3 with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 101–
402.
126. Alaska H.R. 49 (including sponsors from both parties such as Republican
Rep. Paul Seaton and Democrat Rep. Jonathan Kreiss-Tomkins); House of
Representatives,
THE
ALASKA
STATE
LEGISLATURE,
http://house.legis.state.ak.us/rep.php?id=san (last visited Sept. 15, 2016); e-mail
from Taneeka Hansen, legislative aide to Alaska Rep. Paul Seaton, to author (Nov.
7, 2016) (on file with author) [hereinafter Hansen e-mail].
127. Hansen e-mail, supra note 126.
128. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.160).
129. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.100).
130. Compare id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.300) with MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS. §§ 102, 305(a)(1).
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existing corporations. 131 The bill was not proposed to reform Native
corporations, but was instead introduced for many of the same reasons
that other states have adopted benefit corporation statutes—to give
business promoters another choice in entity formation. 132 Under the bill,
Alaska corporations, including Native corporations, could have
converted to benefit corporations by a two-thirds shareholder vote to
amend their articles of incorporation. 133

III. A PROPOSAL TO CONSIDER THE BENEFITS OF THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION ENTITY FOR ALASKA NATIVE CORPORATIONS
Alaska should enact a benefit corporation statute because it would
give Native corporations a legal entity that better aligns with their
purpose. Native corporations have frequently been criticized as a poor
legal entity to further the purposes of ANCSA. 134 The benefit corporation
entity offers Alaska Native corporations a promising alternative.
A.

Benefit Corporation Legislation Offers an Attainable and
Significant Reform Opportunity for Native Corporations

This section will explain why the benefit corporation entity is a better
reform opportunity for Native corporations than (1) attempting to convert
Native corporations to non-profits or (2) enacting a constituency statute
in Alaska. Enacting a benefit corporation statute is the most attainable
opportunity to significantly reform the Native corporations. A
widespread conversion of Native corporations into non-profits is
impractical. ANCSA directed the regional corporations to organize as forprofit businesses under state law, 135 and amending ANCSA is a federal
legislative task. 136 Furthermore, non-profits are not allowed to have
shareholders or pay out a portion of their profits as dividends. 137 Taking
the ability to pay dividends away from the regional Native corporations
131. Telephone Interview with Taneeka Hansen, legislative aide to Alaska Rep.
Paul Seaton (Feb. 22, 2016); see generally Alaska H.R. 49.
132. See generally Alaska H.R. 49 (creating alternative corporate form); see also
SPONSOR
STATEMENT:
CSHB
49
(L&C),
ALASKA
STATE
H.R.,
http://www.housemajority.org/2015/02/18/sponsor-statement-cshb-49-lc/
(stating that the goal of the bill is to “give businesses more flexibility and control
over their decisions and to provide investors with a clear social investment
option,” and making no mention of Alaska Native issues in particular).
133. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010(2),
10.60.700(a)).
134. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 131–43.
135. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012).
136. Id. § 1606(e).
137. ALASKA STAT. § 10.20.136.
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would be far too drastic. Professor Eric C. Chaffee, writing in 2008 before
the emergence of benefit corporations, argued for reforms that would
allow Native corporations to operate with “nonprofit goals.” 138 A benefit
corporation statute would allow Native corporations to do precisely that.
The benefit corporation structure, which only emerged as an option for
states in 2010, 139 requires directors to function somewhat like a non-profit
board. They must consider how their decisions will affect constituencies
and further a variety of public benefits. 140 Native corporations could also
convert to benefit corporations without jeopardizing their ability to pay
dividends to shareholders. 141
Although Alaska does not currently have a constituency statute, 142
enacting one would also fail to provide Native corporations with a
meaningful reform opportunity. Constituency statutes, also known as
stakeholder statutes, are essentially just takeover defense mechanisms,
and mergers and acquisitions are not generally relevant to Native
corporations. 143 As noted earlier in this Note, benefit corporation statutes
make mandatory what stakeholder statutes make permissive.
Corporations already have considerable flexibility to make decisions and
take actions that relate in some way to benefitting their shareholders. 144
Constituency statutes simply give them cover to do so when a takeover is
imminent, adding nothing to the goal of promoting public benefits. 145
B.

Benefit Corporation Legislation Allows Alaska to Initiate Native
Corporation Reform without Federal Involvement

A benefit corporation statute is an ideal reform opportunity for
Native corporations because Alaska could pass a benefit corporation
statute on its own without involving other states or the federal
government. Enacting a benefit corporation statute would not require an
amendment to ANCSA. 146 Michael M. Pacheco has called for a federal
138. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 146–47.
139. RESPONSIFY,
SOCIAL
ENTERPRISE
LAW
TRACKER,
http://www.socentlawtracker.org/#/bcorps (last visited Sept. 22, 2016).
140. Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.100).
141. Id. (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.700(c)).
142. Standley, supra note 65, at 217.
143. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 196–97 (stating that no regional
corporations have merged and few village corporation mergers have occurred).
144. See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036 (“Some have argued that
benefit corporation legislation is unnecessary because current corporate statutes
provide the necessary flexibility to allow social entrepreneurs to pursue nonprofit maximizing strategies.”).
145. Standley, supra note 65, at 218–19.
146. See Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. § 10.60.010(2))
(allowing corporations to change form by amendment to their articles of
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Model Business Corporation Act that would only apply to Indian
tribes. 147 In his view, this would allow Indian corporations to achieve
greater independence from state laws and regulations. 148 However,
Alaska’s courts already have experience deciding cases about Native
corporation issues. 149 In light of this experience, it does not make sense to
cede key disputes about Native corporations to the federal courts.
Enacting a benefit corporation statute is a sensible approach because it is
a local solution. Alaska can pass the legislation on its own without any
federal involvement or coordination with other states required.
Moreover, nothing in the language of ANCSA would seem to preclude
Native corporations from becoming benefit corporations. 150
In addition, the introduction of the benefit corporation legal entity in
Alaska may prevent the need for future changes to ANCSA. Congress
typically amends ANCSA every couple years. 151 These amendments have
given Native corporations the ability to distribute payouts
disproportionately to support certain groups, such as the elderly or
shareholders’ families. 152 Benefit corporations would give Native
corporations a greater level of flexibility on payout distribution and other
confining aspects of traditional corporate law, such as shareholder
primacy. Constant federal revisions to ANCSA in order to preempt state
corporate law would become less of a necessity. This could better position
Native corporations for the long term by reducing their reliance on the
federal government’s biannual amendments to ANCSA, which have
become customary to fix problems as they arise.
The benefit corporation would also be a better model than the
current disjointed structure in which each regional Native corporation
donates money to an associated non-profit. Corporations are allowed to
donate to non-profits, but it may be difficult for shareholders to force
them to commit to do so. Through a benefit corporation, Native
corporations could effectively merge with their associated non-profits
and streamline their efforts and operations. Corporations could also

incorporation).
147. Michael M. Pacheco, Toward a Truer Sense of Sovereignty: Fiduciary Duty in
Indian Corporations, 39 S.D. L. REV. 49, 90 (1994).
148. Id. at 91.
149. See, e.g., Nenana Fuel Co. v. Native Vill. of Venetie, 834 P.3d 1229 (Alaska
1992) (considering whether Native corporations are sovereign entities).
150. ANCSA required the regional corporations to incorporate as for-profit
businesses under state law. 43 U.S.C. § 1606(d) (2012). The village corporations
can also incorporate under state law, but may be set up as non-profits. § 1607(a).
151. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 165 (“Enacted on December 18, 1971,
the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act was to be amended by nearly every
Congress for the next thirty-five years.”).
152. Id. at 197.
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commit to provide specified levels of funding to the services that are
currently provided by the regional Native corporations’ associated nonprofits.
C.

The Chance to Provide Native Corporations an Alternative Legal
Entity is Sufficient Reason for Alaska to Enact a Benefit
Corporation Statute

In Alaska, the chance to provide Native corporations with an
alternative legal entity is sufficient reason to enact a benefit corporation
statute. While benefit corporations are the subject of significant
skepticism, they have unique promise in Alaska because of the reform
opportunity they offer to Native corporations.
When the criticism of the benefit corporation legal entity is analyzed
in relation to Native corporations, much is either irrelevant or mitigated.
Native corporations have a legal obligation to boost shareholder value,
but they are already viewed as having other constituencies. 153 The benefit
corporation entity would force them to take these other groups into
account. As benefit corporations, Native corporations would need to
pursue public benefits, both general and specific. 154 According to the
model legislation, a corporation can identify a “specific public benefit,”
such as “providing low-income or underserved individuals or
communities with beneficial products or services.” 155 This language
would allow Native corporations to focus on providing benefits to a
specific tribe or village, or for Alaska Natives in a designated region.
Within the benefit corporation structure, independent benefit
directors would hold Native corporation directors accountable for
pursuing public benefits. 156 Annual benefit reports would also subject
directors to public scrutiny. 157 As benefit corporations, Native
corporation directors would be legally required to consider shareholder
value as one of many factors. 158 Shareholder value and dividend
payments would have to be assessed alongside other considerations such
as environmental protection, land conservation, cultural heritage, job
creation for villages, or whatever other factors the Native corporation

153. Howard, supra note 6 (“All Native business leaders are faced with far more
taxing demands than just creating profit. Most mission statements include
language like ‘improving the lives of shareholders.’”).
154. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 301(a)(1)(iii)–(vii).
155. Id. § 102.
156. Id. § 302(c).
157. Id. § 401.
158. Id. § 301.
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identified ex ante. 159 Becoming a benefit corporation would require a
Native corporation to reject shareholder primacy in favor of a
multifaceted decision-making approach that considers the needs of many
constituencies.
Because Native corporations often play a role in Native selfgovernance, 160 they are more prepared than other corporations to
consider multiple constituencies and competing factors in their decisionmaking. Professor Loewenstein has criticized the Model Benefit
Corporation Legislation as unworkable. 161 He argues that benefit
corporation directors have an “impossible task” because they are legally
required to weigh many different factors and consider a variety of
constituencies in making their decisions. 162 This criticism of benefit
corporations is overly cynical. The task that the benefit corporation statute
requires of the benefit corporation does not greatly differ from the task
required of non-profit directors like university trustees, elected
government officials, or any other board that is required to consider
factors other than the bottom line. Since Native corporations already
occupy a role in Alaskan society that somewhat parallels a government
entity, their directors are perhaps better conceived as trustees for the
Alaska Native population in the corporation’s respective region or
village. 163 The benefit corporation legal entity would mandate this role for
Native corporation directors.
However, Native corporations have been restricted in their activities
by traditional corporate law. Amendments to ANCSA in 1987 allowed for
the creation of “settlement trusts,” which are a vehicle for providing
disproportionate benefits to particular members of a Native

159. Id.
160. See Douglas M. Branson, Still Square Pegs in Round Holes? A Look at ANCSA
Corporations, Corporate Governance, and Indeterminate Form or Operation of Legal
Entities, 24 ALASKA L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2007) (“Despite certificates as business
corporations, however, ANSCA corporations . . . act as political entities . . . .”); see
also Anderson, supra note 5, at 34–36 (describing how ANCSA was drafted to focus
on land and stating that, as a result, it failed to include any mechanisms promoting
Alaska Native self-government other than the Native corporations themselves,
which were used as “administrative mechanisms” to resolve land disputes);
Alaska v. Native Vill. of Venetie Tribal Gov’t, 522 U.S. 520, 523 (1998) (holding
that land received by Alaska Natives under ANCSA is not “Indian country,” thus
limiting tribal jurisdiction over the land).
161. Loewenstein, supra note 93, at 1036.
162. Id.
163. Biographies of Native corporation directors show that they are respected
leaders in Native communities. See, e.g., Board of Directors, ARCTIC SLOPE REGIONAL
CORP., https://www.asrc.com/About/Pages/Board.aspx#inline14 (last visited
Sept. 16, 2016) (describing how board seats are reserved for residents of each
village).

33.2 NOTE - ROBINSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2016

12/12/2016 7:10 PM

THE BENEFITS OF A B CORP STATUTE

349

community. 164 Previous efforts by Native corporations to support
particular groups in their communities have violated the rule that
corporate dividends must be equally distributed. 165 For example, in
Hanson v. Kake Tribal Corp., 166 the Alaska Supreme Court held that Native
corporations could not engage in a “social welfare program” in which
benefits would flow only to original shareholders. 167 The proposed
program was intended to support families of elderly shareholders
through the purchase of life insurance policies. 168 When the Alaska
Supreme Court struck down the Native corporation’s shareholder life
insurance plan, Congress responded by amending ANCSA in 1998 to
allow the provision of disproportionate benefits to both shareholders and
their families. 169 By naming support of the elderly members of the Native
community and their families as one of the corporation’s specific public
benefits, the Native corporations could justify these kinds of programs if
they were benefit corporations. Although the creation of “settlement
trusts” and the 1998 amendments have addressed these problems
through federal intervention, the benefit corporation would allow for an
Alaska-specific approach to resolving such problems.
As benefit corporation directors, Native corporation directors would
be legally required to assume the public-serving role that to some extent
they are already expected to fulfill. Their decisions would be no more
arbitrary than decisions made by governments or non-profits, such as
universities. Further, the criticism of benefit corporations as merely public
relations or marketing gimmicks does not hold up because benefit
corporation directors face legal liability when they neglect the factors they
are required by the statute to consider. 170 Additionally, Native
corporations do not generally operate consumer-oriented businesses
since they tend to concentrate their businesses in industries like timber,
oil and gas, or mining. 171
Moreover, since Native corporations do not have outside investors,
their relationship with shareholders is perhaps better suited to the benefit
corporation entity structure. Chancellor Strine’s argument—that directors
should not be deciding how to spend other people’s money on social
causes—is not relevant for considering Native corporations as benefit

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197.
Id.
939 P.2d 1320 (Alaska 1997).
Id. at 1324.
Id. at 1322.
CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 197.
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305.
CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 178, 182.
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corporations. 172 Native corporation directors must make decisions about
how to spend money and deploy resources that were entrusted to them
by the federal government through ANCSA. They do not have outside
investors who are expecting a return on their investment. This bolsters
the case for Native corporations as benefit corporations.
Furthermore, Native corporations need a significant reform
opportunity because their financial and economic status quo is
unsatisfactory. Native corporations were bailed out by the federal
government in the 1980s through the use of special tax treatment. 173
Although some are well-run, successful businesses, others have
continued to struggle. 174 Many Alaska Native communities are still stuck
in poverty or lack employment opportunities. Admittedly, changing a
corporation’s legal entity is not itself a business strategy. No evidence
suggests that either the financial performance of Native corporations or
the economic conditions of Alaska Natives would improve solely due to
the transformation of Native corporations into benefit corporations. 175
However, the financial and economic status quo of the Native
corporations is also not a compelling reason to reject the significant
reform opportunity that benefit corporation legislation offers. Native
corporations need a new approach to consider.
In sum, Alaska should enact a benefit corporation statute because it
would provide Native corporations with a meaningful reform
opportunity. Given the persistent criticism of Native corporations and
their significance for Alaska Natives, the opportunities offered by this
reform are sufficient reason for Alaska’s legislature to move forward and
enact a benefit corporation statute.
D.

Native Corporations Should Give their Shareholders the
Opportunity to Vote on Converting to a Benefit Corporation

If Alaska were to enact a benefit corporation statute, the law would
only give Native corporations an alternative legal entity to consider. The
statute would not require them to change their legal structure. 176 This is a
reasonable approach. Alaska should not force Native corporations to
172. Strine, supra note 63, at 149–51.
173. See CASE & VOLUCK, supra note 23, at 180–81 (describing the
congressionally-established temporary moratorium on land taxes for Native
corporations).
174. Chaffee, supra note 6, at 151.
175. See Branson, supra note 160, at 235–36 (arguing that the choice of legal
entity matters less than is commonly believed).
176. See Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010(2),
10.60.700(a)) (giving corporations’ shareholders the choice to change form by
amendment to their articles of incorporation).
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change their legal entity because such coercion would contravene federal
policy. Native corporations should have the chance to decide for
themselves whether their current legal entity status is deficient, and
whether the benefit corporation legal entity would be worthwhile reform.
This Note argues that conversion would be a valuable reform for Native
corporations, but recognizes that the ultimate decision must rest with the
Alaska Native corporations.
Under the model legislation, Native corporations could convert to
benefit corporations by a two-thirds shareholder vote amending their
articles of incorporation. 177 This is a high threshold. Given that many
Alaska Natives rely on the dividend payments from their Native
corporations for their livelihood, 178 this threshold may be too high to
allow any Native corporation to become a benefit corporation. Thus, the
Alaska legislature may want to consider setting a lower conversion
threshold with Native corporations in mind.
Still, this Note argues that Alaska should give Native corporation
shareholders the opportunity to make this choice because conversion
would be worthwhile. Criticism of Native corporations has persisted for
forty-five years and a significant opportunity for reform now exists.
Alaska should seize this opportunity because Native corporations are
integral to the state and Native communities.

CONCLUSION
Alaska should join the majority of states that have enacted benefit
corporation statutes. A benefit corporation statute would provide Native
corporations an opportunity to significantly reform their corporate
governance within the existing framework of ANCSA. The benefit
corporation legal entity better suits the broader intended purpose of the
Native corporations than does their current corporate structure.

177. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 305; see also Alaska H.R. 49, sec. 2 (amending
ALASKA STAT. §§ 10.60.010, 10.60.700(a)(2)) (proposing a two-thirds shareholder
vote for a conversion in line with the model legislation).
178. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 509 (citing an Anchorage Daily News article
describing the possibility that some Alaska Natives may need to live off their
dividend checks due to widespread unemployment).

